The Israeli government’s judicial overhaul,  which aims to dismantle the independence of institutions of power, is also eroding the defense establishment. Speaking from the Knesset podium last month, MK Galit Distel Atbaryan (Likud) quite openly named the government’s targets. “This is the triumvirate against which we are fighting: the top IDF brass, the legal establishment and the media,” she said. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed a new minister of defense, with Israel Katz replacing Yoav Gallant, in part in order to hasten the departure of the top commanders in the IDF. 

The tensions between Defense Minister Katz and the upper command of the IDF our mounting. Since his appointment, Katz has claimed several times that the days of the Minister of Defense acting as a rubber stamp are over. He demanded that IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi complete the military’s probe into the events of October 7 by the end of January, refused to approve the appointment of new officers and went public with disagreements that were traditionally handled in private meetings between the minister and the chief of staff. When IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said, at the end of comments to the media, that “a solution to the issue must be found through dialogue and not through the media,” Katz was quick to chastise him, saying that “the IDF Spokesperson overstepped his authority and preached to the political echelon. An apology will not be enough this time.” The chief of staff gave his backing to Hagari.

The breaking point seems closer than ever after the most recent clash between Katz and the IDF, over several issues including the military’s cooperation with the state comptroller, as well as a leak claiming Katz instructed the army to remove from its response to a High Court of Justice petition the army’s assessment that it could recruit every ultra-Orthodox youth in Israel within three years.

If we look at the talking points on Channel 14 and Galey Israel, who are considered barometers of the government because they often echo its messaging and narratives, before the war these two outlets amplified rifts between pilots and mechanics, as well as between infantry soldiers and pilots. During the course of the war, the focus moved to a campaign that incited “our heroic soldiers” against “the treacherous chief of staff,” thereby increasing the impression that the army chief is a lame duck. “Herzl Halevi is a political chief of staff who does not deserve his rank. Israel cannot win any wars with him at the helm – and he hates half of the people.” These comments were made on Channel 14’s The Patriots show, at a time when Israel was under fire – and the studio audience applauded.

Dr. Idit Shafran Gittleman, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, says that the personnel changes that are expected in the near future are “a way of changing the nature of the army.” Even before the most recent dispute between the IDF Spokesperson and Katz, Jacob Bardugo – a right-wing pundit who is very close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – spoke about the possibility that Hagari (whom he had described in the past as “a leftist”) would be promoted to the rank of general. “Hagari won’t get that position,” Bardugo proclaimed on the Galey Israel radio station. “If Katz were to sign off on something like that, it would be his last act as a minister of defense.”

“The idea that one of the considerations when it comes to promoting an officer is how close he is to the prime minister is already becoming common practice,” says Dr. Shafran Gittleman

“The idea that one of the considerations when it comes to promoting an officer is how close he is to the prime minister is already becoming common practice,” Shafran Gittleman tells Shomrim. “At the same time, there are changes to morals. If MK Amit Halevi (Likud) convenes a meeting of a subcommittee of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to talk about concepts like decisive victory, thanks to a thesis put forward by a right-wing research institute, which argues that the army is putting too much emphasis on values such as ‘human life’ and ‘purity of arms,’ which it says is preventing the IDF from winning the war, then you can understand what direction things are heading. It might not be a structural change, but it is a moral change. And if it continues like this, we will very soon see a completely different IDF.”

On the same issue, there is also legislation in the pipeline that bans human rights organizations from documenting soldiers and granting soldiers extensive legal immunity.

“These proposed laws also contribute to the brutalization of the army. Education officers say that it is currently very hard for them to talk about the spirit of the IDF and the moral code of combat in the army. Soldiers see the purity of arms as a universal value that has nothing to do with the Jewish army. There are also some brigadier generals who do not understand why it’s even needed and when discipline in the military is falling apart, it reflects on everything. There is a video made by Btsalmo and Netsach Israel [right-wing religious organizations] making the rounds among soldiers, in which they burn the IDF code of ethics like they are burning chametz before Pesach (Watch).

“These proposed laws also contribute to the brutalization of the army. Soldiers see the purity of arms as a universal value that has nothing to do with the Jewish army."

“The army is not just one of the institutions that could be harmed by the judicial coup; it is the main candidate – and the coalition isn’t even hiding it. 

Chapter One in the Guide to an Authoritarian Regime

In March 2023, six months before the October 7th massacre, heads of Israel's security services, recognizing the grave security risks posed by the government's judicial overhaul, sought a meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to express their concerns. Their request was denied.

Shomrim drew attention to the threats made to the independence of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) in an article two weeks prior to the attack, but the massacre thrust the agency even more into the spotlight. Its director, along with the IDF Chief of Staff, became primary targets of blame within Netanyahu's government. This served to deflect responsibility for the failures onto the defense establishment, despite the numerous factors contributing to the tragedy.

While the IDF is not formally defined as a "gatekeeper" of democracy, a study by the Israel Democracy Institute, examining countries experiencing democratic decline, revealed a common pattern: the takeover of the army, often following the control of the police and prosecution, is achieved through legislation and the appointment of loyalists to key positions. In Israel, while the Attorney General is resisting this trend, the police are not. The Minister of Public Security personally interviews candidates for promotion to neighborhood police station commanders, assessing their loyalty to his ideology. He has even publicly stated that those who support his policies will be favored in promotions.

Will Minister Katz adopt similar tactics to try and influence IDF appointments, or will he settle for making it clear to the next Chief of Staff that they are expected to adhere to government policy?

According to former Defense Minister and opposition member MK Avigdor Liberman (Yisrael Beiteinu),  on Meet the Press two weeks ago, the government's aim is not necessarily to oust the current Chief of Staff due to the October 7th events, but rather to ensure that his successor aligns with their stance on ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions. They will likely pressure candidates for the position to commit to supporting legislation legalizing such exemptions."

“The IDF is a strong organization with very different DNA to the police,” says Prof. Amichai Cohen. "On the other hand, at least a quarter of the members of the General Staff will lose their jobs. That opens a massive window for interference in appointments."

“The IDF is a strong organization with very different DNA to the police,” says Prof. Amichai Cohen, a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute’s National Security Center. “Traditionally, the minister of defense does not interfere with the chief of staff’s appointments. On the other hand, you have to remember that, at the end of the investigations [into the failure that led to October 7], not only the chief of staff will leave his position. At least a quarter of the members of the General Staff will lose their jobs, along with a good number of the officers serving under them. That opens a massive window for interference in appointments and Ben-Gvir’s conduct with the police can serve as inspiration. But even more worrying when it comes to appointments is what will happen in the Shin Bet. All it takes is two or three appointments and the Shin Bet will fall because it is an extremely hierarchical organization, which is also hidden from public scrutiny.”

It is ironic that the Shin Bet is being seen as the defender of democracy.

“The Shin Bet took on that role when Ami Ayalon was the director, but its main role remains counterterrorism. If it were to fall into irresponsible hands, the damage it could do to democracy would be greater than any of the other defense bodies, because it controls vast databases of information and has been given sweeping powers to help it in the fight against terrorism and espionage.”

There is already a precedent for senior officials being subjected to loyalty tests. According to an investigation by the Uvda television show, Netanyahu asked a candidate for Mossad chief whether he would be loyal to him.

“It’s worrying, indeed. The assessment is that it will be very hard for Netanyahu to fire Ronen Bar, since it is the Shin Bet that is investigating the leak from Military Intelligence which reached Netanyahu’s bureau [the Feldstein affair] and firing him would be a conflict of interests for Netanyahu.”

“The Shin Bet is a very attractive target for politicians, because it is an organization with a lot of power to collect and monitor information and it possesses a lot of information about Israeli citizens,” adds Eli Bahar, a former Shin Bet legal counselor. If somebody wanted to apply an extreme interpretation to the subversion clause in the Shin Bet Law, we could quickly end up with legitimate protest organizations becoming targets for surveillance. Under a different Shin Bet chief, who could acquiesce to the will of politicians, legitimate groups like Brothers in Arms could be put under surveillance.”

This sounds extreme.

“In an authoritarian regime, the first page of the guidebook is to take control of the security services. We see what is happening in other countries now and throughout history. Here, too, the massive powers that have been granted to a domestic security agency like the Shin Bet could easily be used to restrict the activities of anyone who opposes the government or to provide services to the government, such as fulfilling requests to protect the prime minister and his family, or could be asked to provide a bias opinion, which could disrupt with the prime minister’s testimony in his criminal trial.”

Bahar goes on to warn that “because it is in the nature of the Shin Bet that its hierarchy and internal discipline are much tighter than in the army, appointing a director who wants to please the political echelon could create a very grave danger. I believe that Ronen Bar understands this and, because he has a sense of responsibility, and as long as he is concerned that his successor will distort the norms of the organization, he will not quit. He understands that would be deserting the Shin Bet.”

“The Shin Bet is a very attractive target for politicians, because it is an organization with a lot of power to collect and monitor information and it possesses a lot of information about Israeli citizens,” adds Eli Bahar, a former Shin Bet legal counselor.

Militias? ‘We’re Already in a Different Place’

Whether or not Ronen Bar steps down, the departure of Halevi as Chief of Staff, along with the likely future resignations of additional top IDF officers following the conclusion of the October 7 investigation, will provide the coalition with an opportunity to reshape the army and – just as all the political partners to the judicial coup have their interests, here, too, each party has its own vision of what the IDF should look like – a vision that squares with the reasons that led them to join the judicial coup.

Bezalel Smotrich, for example, is pushing for the annexation of the West Bank by giving the Civil Administration control and by enshrining in religious nationalism in law. Indeed, Shomrim has written in the past about the spread of a religious-nationalist ideology in the IDF. Itamar Ben-Gvir promotes Jewish supremacy and general chaos by advancing the annulling of judicial oversight over the conduct of soldiers during operational activity. The ultra-Orthodox are eager to institutionalize and legalize their draft dodging, while Netanyahu is keen to appoint a Chief of Staff who is personally loyal to him.

“The judicial coup sees the military legal system as part of the deep state,” says Prof. Yagil Levy, who researches civil-military relations at the Open University. "It is trying to end the commitment to international law which the army sees itself as obligated to, therefore it also attacks the supremacy of the Military Advocate General as an institution. This did not start today; it’s a clash that has been going on for several years. Naftali Bennett said as far back as 2018 that soldiers are more afraid of the Military Advocate General than they are of Sinwar – but now the clash comes from a place of power, which did not exist in the past.

“In the case of Elor Azaria, we witnessed protests on social media platforms and people shouting ‘Gadi, beware! Rabin is looking for you’ outside the military courthouse. The judicial coup has institutionalized this clash, and the war gave it an even stronger tailwind. In the past, governments gave full backing to the chief of staff so that he could ensure military discipline. October 7 weakened the General Staff and left it without backing and now it has only limited control over the army.”

So, is the threat of militias more imminent than ever?

“It was curbed somewhat during the Azaria trial, because people were not ready for that kind of move. But now we’re in a different place. When the chief of staff suspended soldiers who played songs and called ‘Shema Yisrael’ over the loudspeaker of a mosque in Jenin, he was roundly lambasted by the government. And when politicians invite the IDF spokesperson to appear before the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to scold him and civilians are allowed to enter a warzone alongside soldiers, as happened in the case of Ze’ev Erlich in Lebanon, which led to the death of one of the soldiers accompanying him - this amounts to soldiers been given informal permission to do whatever they want. And senior commanders from the national-religious camp can act in accordance with their beliefs – without any of the concerns that existed in the past.” 

Are you referring to Brig. Gen. Yehuda Vach, who, according to an investigation by Haaretz, imposed his personal worldview on the combat in Gaza?

"If that report is accurate, it suggests that the authority of the Southern Command's commander to impose discipline on an officer with strong ties to religious-nationalist circles, who is actively pursuing an agenda supported by the government, is now more constrained than in the past."

The erosion of the value of Mamlakhtiyut – a Hebrew concept combining statism, impartiality, and putting the good of the country first – comes as no surprise to Dr. Eran Shamir-Borer, the former head of the Military Advocate General’s International Law Department and now director of the Israel Democracy Institute’s Center for Security and Democracy. An opinion poll published by the IDI in November showed that most of the Jewish population of Israel supports the removal of ethical and legal restrictions on the IDF’s operational activity – even activity that directly violates orders and the military code of ethics.

The change in public opinion has come quickly over the past six years. What was once supported only by a minority of Israelis is now the prevalent view. For example, 63 percent of Jewish Israelis support executing a neutralized terrorist, even if he poses no danger to soldiers; among people who vote for right-wing parties, it goes up to 80 percent. It is safe to assume that the events of October 7 and the subsequent war also contributed to the acceleration of these trends.

“When obeying the law becomes a political position,” Shamir-Borer explains, “it also impacts on the army. And since the IDF is the people’s army, especially during wartime, and given that so many people have been called up for reserve duty, public opinion on normative issues like the rule of law and basic human rights seep into the army. When people in the government attack the army commander, public trust in the highest levels of the IDF becomes an issue that divides the Jewish population in accordance with their political beliefs. That could contribute to the erosion of commanders’ authority.

“The most worrisome phenomenon which has characterized the current war – of soldiers posting videos to social media, which makes an absolute mockery of standing orders and the IDF code of conduct – is perhaps a reflection of these two processes. These soldiers, many of them reservists, are not ashamed to publish deeds that would appear to be a complete violation of the law, even though senior officers have repeatedly called on them to abide by the regulations.”

In your estimation, how are these matters being handled?

“There are some cases which do not warrant the involvement of the Military Advocate General or the Military Police; disciplinary action by the soldiers’ direct commanders should be enough. But I get the impression that even this does not happen often. Even when commanders do take disciplinary action, the army is afraid of making it public, even though it could help with deterrence and imposing discipline – and could also help Israel deal with the legal and political dangers on the international front. For the most part, the army will not make it public when, for example, it dismissed soldiers for unjustifiably damaging civilian Palestinian property, because, given the public atmosphere that currently exists, such a move would be highly unpopular.”

“When obeying the law becomes a political position,” says Dr. Shamir-Borer, “it also impacts on the army. And since the IDF is the people’s army, especially during wartime, and given that so many people have been called up for reserve duty."

Army Enforcement has been Deterred

Maj.-Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, the Military Advocate General, stands virtually alone in her public resistance to the political echelon's attempts to delegitimize the rule of law. This isolation stems, in part, from the conspicuous silence of Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara on critical issues pertaining to war ethics.

For instance, Baharav-Miara has remained silent on the so-called "Generals' Plan," a proposal by Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland advocated for the starvation of Palestinians refusing to leave northern Gaza. She has also not publicly condemned the policy of targeted assassinations of individuals involved in the October 7th attacks who are not members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, the Attorney General has offered no clear public statement regarding the investigation into events at the Sde Teiman detention facility.

While Baharav-Miara typically expresses her views through legal opinions and responses to High Court petitions, a more vocal public stance in support of the Military Advocate General, who is constrained by her position within the IDF, might be warranted in this instance.

"It appears that Baharav-Miara is strategically choosing her battles, and undoubtedly faces numerous challenges," observes an individual with extensive knowledge of the past working relationship between the Attorney General and the Military Advocate General. "However, effectively challenging operational policies becomes significantly more difficult without the Attorney General's backing. Historically, a unified and coordinated approach existed, with the Attorney General addressing the cabinet and government, while the Military Advocate General focused on the army. This collaborative dynamic appears to have eroded. Even when politicians incite indiscriminate killing and other unlawful actions, the Attorney General refrains from assertive enforcement measures that could influence soldiers' behavior. One could argue that she has effectively recused herself from addressing these critical incidents."

Maybe by making public comments, she would only be confirming that the phenomenon exists, which would damage Israel’s defense at the International Criminal Court?

“The opposite is true. The right kind of statement could help to make it clear that exceptions are just that and that they do not reflect policy. If the attorney general were to speak up, it would make it easier for the military advocate general and commanders to implement a more determined policy of enforcement in the IDF.” A spokesperson for the attorney general declined to comment on the matter.

Like the attorney general on other fronts, the military advocate general has become the target of vicious attacks. During the trial of Elor Azaria, the military advocate general came under attack, but it was in the spirit of the times; the attacks against Tomer-Yerushalmi are far more extreme. These attacks intensified some six months ago, when a group of reserve soldiers were investigated for sexually abusing a terrorist from Hamas Nukhba Force at the Sde Teiman detention facility. When the reservists were detained by Military Police, dozens of protestors – some of them armed – broke into Sde Teiman and to the military court at Beit Lid, where the suspects were being questioned. The Israel Police, which is responsible for handling demonstrations outside of military bases, did not intervene – and the IDF was forced to redeploy two battalions from the Gaza Strip to secure the area.

Among those who broke into the base were Minister of Heritage Amihai Eliyahu (Otzma Yehudit) and Knesset members Nissim Vaturi (Likud) and Zvi Sukkot (Religious Zionism). When a complaint was filed against them to the Knesset Ethics Committee and the attorney general was asked to open a criminal investigation into the affair, Sukkot, along with 17 other members of the coalition, submitted legislation that would expand lawmakers’ immunity and grant them free access to military bases and prisons, supposedly in order to be able to monitor them. Currently, only the heads of two Knesset committees, the attorney general and judges are allowed free access.

Sukkot got the backing of his party chairman on the very day that the incident occurred, when Smotrich published a video in which he called on the military advocate general “to get her hands off our soldiers.” Two weeks later, when Tomer-Yerushalmi appeared before the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, MK Limor Son Har-Melech (Otzma Yehudit) accused her of “obsessively trying to harm soldiers.” At a meeting of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, MK Tally Gotliv (Likud) said that the attorney general and the military advocate general “have declared open season on our soldiers,” while Son Har-Melech said that they will be “put on trial for the actions.”

The reservists suspected of abuse have not yet been charged and there have been recent claims that the Military Police has been deterred from investigating the violent behavior of those protestors who broke into the base because of pressure from right-wing politicians on the IDF. Likewise, there has been no progress on the investigation that the military advocate general ordered Military Police to open into the April 2024 attack on a World Central Kitchen convoy carrying humanitarian aid in Gaza.

“The military prosecution claims that it is investigating allegations of war crimes, but the best proof that this is not happening, at least since the Sde Teiman incident, is that you don’t hear any noise,” says Levy, who believes that the military enforcement apparatus has been deterred. “There might be investigations into phenomena like looting and destroying private property in Gaza – but what about executions? What about violations of the rules of engagement? If they were to investigate those incidents, the right would go ballistic.”

The bill submitted by MK Hanoch Milwidsky, which calls for the establishment of military courts for Nukhba terrorists, poses a threat to both the military and civilian justice systems. It proposes that the committee responsible for appointing judges to these special military courts consist of a five-member panel, three of whom would be politicians from the ruling coalition. According to the Political Scientists for Israeli Democracy—a forum that monitors legislation introduced as part of the judicial overhaul—the committee that appoints judges to regular military courts currently comprises nine members, only three of whom are politicians, with the remainder being jurists or military officers.

“The judicial coup sees the military legal system as part of the deep state,” says Prof. Yagil Levy. "It is trying to end the commitment to international law which the army sees itself as obligated to, therefore it also attacks the supremacy of the Military Advocate General as an institution."

Legislation that Would Wreak havoc on the IDF

These phenomena are also evident in other areas. The ultra-Orthodox national religious camp and the approach that it represents have, over the years, become a major part of the army experience. Rabbis bless the troops before they go into battle, and it was not uncommon over the past 15 months to see soldiers wear ‘Messiah’ patches on their uniforms. When the chief of staff encountered one such soldier, he tore the patch off and reminded the soldier that it was not a regulation uniform. If it makes you feel better, Halevi told the soldier, carry it in your pocket. The incident raised a major public storm – and Channel 14 even aired a skit ridiculing the chief of staff (Watch).

However, the phenomenon is not limited to experience and symbols. Efforts to curb the army’s control over the representation of religion in the military were also part of the coalition agreements. In its agreement with the Religious Zionism party, for example, Netanyahu’s Likud agreed that the chief rabbi IDF will no longer be appointed by the chief of staff, but by a committee headed by the chief Sephardi rabbi of Israel, and that the chief rabbi IDF will be subordinate to the Rabbinate and not the chief of staff on matters of halakha. This clause has yet to be implemented. Meanwhile, a bill put forward by Sukkot to safeguard the right to a religious lifestyle while serving in the army seeks, according to Yagil Levy, “to tie the army’s hands and not make do with General Staff orders. One of the characteristics of the relationship between the army and the Knesset, for better or for worse, was the avoidance of over-legislation. Now the politicians are dabbling in that, too.”

Two additional bills aim to solidify these policies, but they also risk creating significant chaos. The first is the so-called Expanded Feldstein Law, approved this week by the Ministerial Committee on Legislation. Proposed by MK Simcha Rothman, chairman of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, the bill seeks to grant immunity from prosecution to members of the defense establishment who share sensitive intelligence directly with the prime minister, a cabinet member, or the chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

A similar bill was introduced by MKs Milwidsky and Halevi (Likud). Its goal is to retroactively legalize actions in the so-called Bild Affair, where sensitive Military Intelligence documents were leaked to a German newspaper. The bill also seeks to bolster the claim that the army has been withholding information from Netanyahu. The attorney general has strongly opposed the bill, which is currently being prepared for its first Knesset reading, warning that it could lead to “illegitimate political interference in a criminal process involving individuals close to the prime minister” and politicize Military Intelligence operations.

Another proposal—also submitted by the industrious MK Halevi—seeks to establish a “devil’s advocate unit” within the Prime Minister's Office. This unit is intended to support the narrative that a specific division within Military Intelligence failed, which allegedly led the prime minister to adopt a flawed strategic outlook. Proponents argue this justifies Netanyahu’s need for such a unit. However, critics point out that the National Security Council, already under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office, is meant to fulfill this exact role. “This, too, represents an attempt to shift control from the defense establishment to politicians, allowing them to gather intelligence according to their own priorities,” says Prof. Levy.

From the perspective of Smotrich, who also serves as a minister in the Defense Ministry, the greatest achievement of the judicial coup this far is that he managed to take control of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria – with the ultimate goal of replacing them with government ministries in the event that Israel annexes the West Bank. Next month, the High Court of Justice will hear a petition filed by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Yesh Din, who argue that transferring these powers from the army to the Smotrich’s settlement authority has created a de facto annexation.

“The army was stripped of its powers of management but not its responsibility,” says Michael Sfard, Yesh Din’s legal advisor. “This means that the IDF has been removed from the decision- and policy-making process but is still in charge of security – so if, in the past, it delayed or nixed a certain move in order not to spark violence, now its role is not to give any kind of feedback. The authority that was once held by the head of the Civil Administration has now been transferred to a civilian appointed by Smotrich.”

In the end, they still need the army 

Smotrich is aware of this. He needs to demolish Palestinian homes, so he included in the state budget the establishment of a security unit that is not part of the military, to avoid reliance on the IDF for this purpose. It's important to understand that this is occupied territory; a civilian body representing the government cannot manage affairs there, as that would constitute annexation. The military is not considered a direct representative of the citizens of Israel and the settlers, unlike Smotrich, who is defined as such.

Where is it evident on a day-to-day basis?

“In the past, I would call the army when I was contacted by a Palestinian whose tractor was confiscated. Now I call Smotrich’s people. It’s true that the army is not a neutral player, but the settlement authority and the whole apparatus under Smotrich are the most interested parties possible.”

Smotrich’s spokesperson did not respond to Shomrim’s request for comment. The state is due to submit its response to the High Court of Justice by early next week.

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit submitted the following response: “Decisions by IDF enforcement agencies are made based on practical and professional considerations only. The events in Sde Teiman and Beit Lid are being investigated as part of a joint investigation team of the Israel Police and the Military Police. Suspicions of violence against Military Police officers during the incident were thoroughly investigated and much activity has already been conducted. The investigation has not yet been completed, so we are not at liberty to elaborate on the details.”

In regard to the attack on the aid vehicle in April 2024, the statement that it was “a complex operational incident which requires an in-depth examination. A decision on the matter will be made in the near future.”