Embarrassing photographs from the personal album of Bashar al-Assad are not the only thing to have been leaked to social media sites since the Syrian despot fled his country on December 8. Shortly after the fall of the regime in Damascus, the internet was flooded with what was identified as classified documents from within the Syrian security establishment. An analysis of these documents reveals details of the mechanisms of cooperation between Israel and Russia on the Syrian front, as well as the informal contact between Jerusalem and the Assad regime, which were kept far from the public eye. One document, dated mid-2023, before the October 7 Hamas attack, reveals a channel of communication between an Israeli official known only as Moussa (or Moshe) and Syria’s then-defense minister, General Ali Mahmoud Abbas, who in turn relayed the messages to General Ali Mamlouk, who was director of the National Security Bureau at the time and was one of the most powerful figures in the Assad regime.

Although the authenticity of the documents cannot be independently verified, multiple sources and officials who spoke with Shomrim believe there is a strong likelihood that they are genuine. These sources point to the format and content of the documents, which align with known events reported in the media—such as Israeli strikes in Syria and various political incidents—as evidence supporting their credibility.

According to the documents, Israel once again threatened – this time through Moussa – to escalate its attacks against Syria if the regime failed to stop Iranian cargo planes transporting weapons to Hezbollah. For example, in one of the documents the following sentence appears: “We have identified that, since the 6^th or 7^th of July, none of the Syrian Air Force’s Ilyushin 76 aircraft from the 29^th Brigade are landing at the [Russian] Khmeimim [airbase, located close to Latakia in western Syria]. These planes were also used to transport weapons to the [Iranian] al-Quds Brigade, as well as Hezbollah,” the document added.

At the same time, while the secret files indicate that Israel was more than willing to exact a heavy price from Syria if it continued to cooperate with Iran and its proxies, the document also suggests that Israel would be willing to ensure that Syria’s “military needs” would be met as long as it continued to operate under Russian supervision. In other words, even after Russia launched its war in Ukraine, became a pariah state in the eyes of the West and, most significantly, solidified its military and political alliance with Iran – Israel was still willing to rely on Russian supervision of Syria and was kind enough to entrust Moscow with the task of ensuring that terrorist organizations in the Shi’ite axis did not obtain weapons.

“We do not want to operate against the Arab Syrian army,” was one of the messages from Israel that was quoted in a document from June 2023, “therefore, using the organized mechanism of Russian inspection will allow you [the Syrians] to answer the military’s needs without taking the risk that the Iranians will use various infrastructure and sites to transport weapons. Any unmonitored activity that is not supervised by the Russians will be considered a direct threat to Israel and will provoke a response.”

According to analysts with whom Shomrim spoke, the overlapping interests of Russia, Iran and Syria over the years included strengthening the Shi’ite axis in the Middle East. The Israeli conception, whereby Russia would monitor Iranian weapons shipments, turned out to be baseless. And the facts on the ground also proved that Russia was not monitoring any such shipments. Indeed, according to a report in Haaretz, after the IDF entered Lebanon, Israeli forces uncovered stockpiles of Russian-made anti-tank missiles which had been supplied to Hezbollah via the Syrian army. These Russian weapons are particularly effective and have taken the lives of many soldiers and civilians against whom they were used.

It was only after the start of the ground operation in Lebanon that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively confirmed that the Russian conception – most of which was formulated during his time in office – had collapsed. In a rare moment of pointing the finger at Moscow, Netanyahu said in an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro that “Hezbollah has dug hundreds of tunnels and caches, where we have just found a quantity of state-of-the-art Russian weapons.”

The document suggests that Israel would be willing to ensure that Syria’s “military needs” would be met as long as it continued to operate under Russian supervision.

Regular meetings – even after October 7

The origins of the Syria conception go back almost a decade.Netanyahu, along with then-IDF chief Gadi Eizenkot and then-Military Intelligence chief and current chief of staff Herzl Halevi, flew to Moscow in September 2015, to formalize the workings of the mechanism designed to ensure that there would be no incidents between Israeli and Russian forces. This came shortly after Russia began to openly provide military assistance to the Assad regime, aimed at propping it up against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war, which began some three years earlier. This mechanism was brought up frequently in the context of Israeli attacks in Syria, but until now very little was known about its actual workings.

“First of all, we have a close military border with Russia. Our pilots are flying right next to Russian pilots over the skies of Syria,” Netanyahu told the Jerusalem Post in an interview in June 2023, in an effort to justify his government’s decision not to send weapons to Ukraine. As Shomrim revealed in June, Israel also rejected an offer from Ukraine to cooperate over defensive measures against the Iranian drone threat. It was only in late 2024 – after Hezbollah began using Iranian drones to attack Israel – that the government finally started to reach out to companies in Ukraine to cooperate in efforts to counter this threat, as Shomrim revealed at the time.

“There is a joint mechanism in place between Israel and Russia, which has been operating, in one form or another, since 2016,” a source closely involved in the workings of that mechanism told Shomrim. “The goal was to ensure that there would be no clashes between the sides in the crowded arena in which Russia and Israel both operate.”

Within the framework of this coordination mechanism, Russia and Israel exchanged information about their operations in the region. “There were years when the communication was closer and years when it was less so,” one diplomatic source told Shomrim. Another security source said that the mechanism continued operating even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 – despite the fact that Russia moved closer to both Iran and Hamas. “There were regular meetings every few months, in Israel or Russia,” the source said. “Some of these meetings were reported on by the media, while others were not.”

Current and former Israeli officials describe this mechanism as a useful tactical tool to navigate and minimise risks between two countries, Israel and Russia, seeking to avoid direct confrontation. Yet, many who talked to Shomrim resent the politicization of this mechanism by Israeli politicians, including its use as an argument to avoid sending military aid to Ukraine, which is fighting for its very existence. 

Former Knesset member Ofer Shelah, who served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and is now director of the Israel National Security Policy research program at Institute for National Security Studies, recognizes the tactical value of the mechanism, but told Shomrim that it was wrong for Israel to include it in its considerations when it came to the government’s position on various global and strategic issues, including the war between Russia and Ukraine.

“Not standing by Ukraine’s side because of our mechanism for avoiding incidents in Syria was, in my opinion, both a mistake and childish,” he said. “The fact that, in Israel, they accepted this argument as the real reason for the decision testifies, in my opinion, to narrow-mindedness and a childish Israeli approach to global issues. I don’t think that the deconfliction mechanism was the real reason that we did not come to Ukraine’s assistance. It was nothing more than an excuse.”

One former senior Israeli defense official with whom Shomrim spoke added that Israel gave Russia the impression that it was “doing us a favor” by supposedly turning a blind eye to Israeli strikes inside Syria. Netanyahu, he says, tended to boast about his personal relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the agreement he reached with Moscow.

Indeed, in 2019 he even launched an election campaign using the slogan “In a different league,” with a massive billboard showing him shaking Putin’s hand. According to the former official, however, the mechanism was just as important to Russia. Moscow, he explained, wanted to portray its involvement in Syria as a successful and inexpensive operation and it would not have been able to do so if Russian soldiers were being killed on Syrian soil. “Israel was operating on its home territory, with technology that was head and shoulders above Russian technology; Russia, meanwhile, was operating far from its own borders and with limited resources. The incident-preventing mechanism was useful, but it was just as vital to Russia as it was to us.”

In a rare moment of pointing the finger at Moscow, Netanyahu said “Hezbollah has dug hundreds of tunnels and caches, where we have just found a quantity of state-of-the-art Russian weapons.”

Dermer’s last-minute efforts

Russia's already strong ties with Iran deepened further following the invasion of Ukraine, as Moscow became heavily dependent on Iranian arms - particularly its drone industry. Even in recent months, as Israel shifted the focus of its military operations to the northern front, it continued to place its bets on Russia, hoping it would assume a more substantial role in the region.

Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, who is one of Netanyahu’s closest confidants, traveled to Moscow along with other officials close to the Israeli prime minister, in the hope of getting Russia involved in the ceasefire deal that was being brokered between Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli officials also wanted Russia’s help thwarting arms shipments from Syria to Lebanon. In early November, newly appointed Foreign Minister Gidon Sa’ar also publicly stated that Russia can play a role in preventing Hezbollah rearming itself through Syria.

Israel’s decision to continue betting on Russia, right up to the moment that Assad fled Syria, raised eyebrows among Western diplomats.

One European diplomat confirmed to Shomrim that Israel did indeed hope that Russia would be able to play a role in the ceasefire in Lebanon, but that the United States and its special envoy Amos Hochstein, vetoed the proposal.

Now, Russia’s role in the Middle East is shrouded in uncertainty. Although Russian deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov recently said that Russia is keen to maintain its existing bases in Syria by reaching an agreement with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham – the rebel group behind the successful offensive against Assad’s forces – Moscow has already relocated a large proportion of its people and equipment from Syria to Libya. Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said that this included the advanced Russian S-400 and S-300 air defense systems, which are among the fundamental reasons for the existence of the mechanism to prevent incidents between Russia and Israel.

Is the Israeli conception vis-à-vis Russia finally changing? “I believe that Israel is now starting to view Russia's reputation differently, " says Arkady Milman, a former Israeli ambassador in Moscow who is now a senior researcher and head of the Russia Program at the Institute for National Security Studies. “In the end, Russian influence in Syria has been greatly diminished and I would very much like to see the political and military establishment in Israel finally realize that we cannot count on Russia.”

The Prime Minister's Office did not submit a response to this article.